The following is about what democracy is not or what democracy may not be capable of producing. There is a temptation to load too many expectations on this concept and to imagine that by attaining democracy, a society will have resolved all of its political, social, economic, administrative and cultural problems. Unfortunately, all good things do not necessarily go together.

First, democracies are not necessarily more efficient economically than other forms of government. Their rates of growth, savings, and investment may be no better than those of non-democracies. This is especially likely during a transition, when property-owning groups and administrative elites may respond to real or imagined threats to the “rights” they enjoyed under authoritarian rule by initiating capital flight, disinvestment, or sabotage. In time, depending upon the type of democracy, benevolent long-term effects upon income distribution, aggregate demand, education, productivity, and creativity may eventually combine to improve economic and social performance, but it is certainly too much to expect these immediately.

Second, democracies are not administratively easy to run. Democracy may even be slower in decision making than that of the regimes they replace, because more actors must be consulted. The costs of getting things done may be higher, if only because “payoffs” have to be made to a wider and more resourceful set of clients (although one should never underestimate the degree of corruption to be found within autocracies). Popular satisfaction with the new democratic government’s performance may not seem greater, if only because necessary compromises often please no one completely, and because the losers are free to complain.

Third, democracies are not likely to appear more orderly, consensual, stable, or governable than the autocracies they replace. This is partly a byproduct of democratic freedom of expression, but it is also a reflection of the likelihood of continuing disagreement over new rules and institutions. Ideas for the new rules or institutions are often initially vague in nature and uncertain in effect until actors have learned how to use them. What is more, they come in the aftermath of serious struggles motivated by high ideals. Groups and individuals with recently acquired autonomy will test certain rules, protest against the actions of certain institutions, and insist on renegotiating their part of the bargain. The important thing is that parties are willing, however reluctantly, to play by the general rules of boundeduncertainty and contingent consent.