Most federal constitutions have developed ways to facilitate cooperation, and coordination between central, and regional governments. Informally they are carried out through direct communications, between ministers, officials and representatives of central and regional governments and formal institutions. These might take the form of meetings involving ministers, legislators, officials, and agencies of different governments.

In addition to central-regional cooperation, inter-regional relations are also common in many federal systems. This cooperation often deals with cross-boundary issues affecting neighboring regions. For example, regional governments in Germany have made agreements (independently of the central government) to regulate shop and restaurant closing times to avoid closing times influencing consumer behavior in regions and causing economic imbalance.

Sometimes inter-regional cooperation has been extended to cover all the regions within a federation. For example, Australia has a Council of Australian Governments (comprising the Prime Minister, State Premiers, Territory Chief Ministers, and the President of the Australian Local Government Association), and the Council of the Australian Federation comprising the Premiers and Chief Ministers from all Australian States and Territories, to coordinate service delivery, and work with the national government.

Upper Houses in Federal Systems

In general, a common structural characteristic of federal systems is that there is a provision for the representation of distinct regional views within the national policy-making institutions. This is usually through the representation of regional representatives in a federal second legislative chamber. The principle of bicameralism has been incorporated into the federal legislatures of most federations. There is, however, much variation among them in the composition, powers and the role of the second chambers in different federal countries.

In most federal legislatures, one chamber is based on the principle of the representation of the people, so that membership is based on the population in each of the sub-units. The other chamber represents the sub-units at the national level. The purpose of this second chamber is to protect their interests of the subunits and enable them to participate in the governance of the whole country.

Selection of Members of The Upper House

There is a lot of variation among federations in the method of selection for these regional members. This usually involves a combination of appointments and elections. In Australia, the USA, and Switzerland, the citizens living in regions directly elect members to the upper house. In Canada, members of the upper house are appointed by the federal Prime Minister and hold office until their retirement at 75. Malaysia, Belgium, and Spain have a mixed membership through indirect elections and appointments. In most federations, there is some effort to weight representation in favor of smaller constituent units or significant minorities.

In Germany, each regional government has a certain number of votes in the second chamber, determined by the region’s population, and the regional governments may choose as many members as they have votes; in South Africa, each province has ten members: four who are members of the provincial legislature and six nonmembers of the provincial legislature nominated by the parties at the province level. The US Senate has an equal number of members from each state, while the House of Representatives has representatives from each state, determined by the population of the state. The Senate also has a higher minimum age-requirement for its senators than the House of Representatives has for its representatives.

The Role of Upper Houses in Federal Systems

Some second chambers directly represent constituent units at the federal level. In others, they are designed to give voice or some veto powers to certain minorities. In Nigeria, for example, the Senate, the second chamber is designed to provide a check and balance on the federal executive and majoritarian rule. In Germany and South Africa, second chambers are used as a framework for negotiations between the national and sub-national governments (in which case, there is representation of sub-national governments, rather than of people directly).

In some countries, the second chamber represents not sub-national units, but ethnic communities (as in Ethiopia), providing a different kind of balance between the national government and communities. The Ethiopian second chamber has the explicit responsibility of protecting the rights and interests of sub-national units and ethnic communities, ensuring adequate budgetary allocations and interpreting the constitution. In order to accomplish this task, it is constitutionally granted the power to ‘interpret’ the Constitution, to solve disputes among the regions, and decide on joint taxes.

Constitutional Amendments in Federal Legislatures

Regarding constitutional amendments, federalism requires a balance between rigidity and flexibility. It can do this by providing different amendment procedures for different parts of the constitution.

For example, the Canadian constitution has five different procedures for amendment involving varying degrees of rigidity. Often, both houses of the federal legislature are engaged in the approval of amendments concerned with the distribution of powers and integrity of the regional governments. For example, in the USA, India, Malaysia requires a supermajority in both houses for an amendment to be approved. A super majority requires a number of votes that is higher than 50% to be accepted e.g., 66%. While in Switzerland and Canada only a simple majority is required for an amendment to be approved.

In addition, such amendments often require either approval by a special majority of the regional legislatures, (e.g. The USA and Canada) or a simple majority of state legislatures (e.g. India), or by referendum requiring a “double majority” in case of Switzerland and Australia. A double majority requires a majority of votes according to two separate criteria. For example, in Australia, constitutional changes must be passed at a referendum in a majority of states (4 of the 6), and by a majority of voters nationally.

Constitutional Amendment in Some Federations The United States Constitution requires approval of two-thirds of members in both national houses and of three-quarters of states. Brazil requires 60 per cent in both houses, but, given the dominance of senators from small states, this is a high threshold. Spain requires special majorities within the two houses but no role for the autonomous communities. Austria normally requires only a special majority in the lower house or a national majority in a referendum. Belgium, though not centralized, has an elaborate procedure culminating in a need for a two thirds majority in both houses and often a majority vote within each linguistic group as well. Russia normally requires supermajorities in both houses and two-thirds of subjects of the federation. South Africa requires special majorities in the lower house plus the consent of six of the nine provinces for amendments affecting them. Australia requires double majorities of those voting in a national referendum on changes to the federal constitution: a national majority plus majorities in four of the six states. Some federations have different amendment rules for different sections of their constitution: thus, Canada has at least five rules, with some issues requiring unanimous consent. Likewise, India has different rules for different sections: the unusual noninvolvement of states in changes to state boundaries was deliberately chosen in the expectation that early adjustments to state boundaries would have to be made. Source: Federalism: An Introduction

Boundaries, Merger of Units, and Creation of New Units

In ethnic federations, the number of units is usually increased by the fragmentation of existing units (as in India, Nigeria, and Spain). In some cases, there may be disputes about the boundaries of neighbouring units, and sometimes there may be pressure to merge some units. As a result, it is important that the constitution provide clear procedures for the splitting or merging of units and the changing of boundaries. These provisions should make it neither too easy nor too difficult to change the sizes of and the number of the units. If the procedure is too easy, many demands for new units could be made, and if it too difficult, the failure to make necessary adjustments when required could lead to conflict.

The rules that federations include in their constitutions for the creation of new sub units or revisions to boundaries range from very flexible to extremely rigid. Procedures may give the authority to the national parliament alone (by simple majority of both houses, as in India, or by special majority, as in Kenya and Belgium), to the national parliament plus the affected sub-unit governments (by simple majority, as in the United States and Australia, or by special majority, as in Pakistan), to the national parliament plus both the affected and all sub-units (as in Canada), or to a special majority of sub-units (as in Nigeria). There can also be procedures for citizen initiatives to start the process of considering boundary revisions or creating new units (Germany, Nigeria, Iraq).

Sub-unit Constitutions

It is important that a single national constitution outlines the key features and limits of the federation, including the division of powers, relations between governments at different levels, methods for resolving disputes, and methods for interpreting and amending the constitution. The structures of government at the sub-national levels are generally outlined in the constitution of the sub-national unit. Subnational constitutions are free to establish the institutions of the unit and its system of government, but they must be consistent with the national constitution.There can be significant differences between constitutions of sub-national units (e.g., some are unicameral and others bicameral, some may have their own bills of rights, while others may rely on the national constitution; and in Malaysia, some are monarchical, but others are ‘republican’). In a few countries, the national constitution also deals with the structures of government in the sub-national units (India, Nigeria, and Pakistan).